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Preaching in uncertain terms
The place of hedging language 
in contemporary sermonic discourse
Hans Malmström
Lund University
This study investigates hedging (standardly assumed to express uncertainty, 
plausible reasoning and the like) in contemporary sermonic discourse as repre-
sented by sermon manuscripts from three Christian denominations in the UK. 
The article addresses three research questions: (i) To what extent is preaching 
employed as a discursive resource during preaching; (ii) What form does hedg-
ing take in sermonic discourse; and (iii) What are preachers’ rationale for hedg-
ing? The results suggest that hedging is indeed of central concern in sermonic 
discourse with some kind of hedging device being called upon once every 32 
seconds. When preachers hedge they rely on standard and transparent linguistic 
expressions that typically perform this discourse function, and the repertoire in-
cludes both ‘conversational’ hedges and hedges that recall practices characteristic 
of written academic discourse. When preachers self-report on their rationale for 
hedging a multitude of different discourse functions become apparent. However, 
it seems that hedging is rarely used to convey lack of epistemic confidence; 
rather, hedging is seen as a productive interpersonal means to address one of 
the main objectives of contemporary, turn-to-the-listener, preaching — namely 
acknowledging sermon listeners as active partners in a sermonic experience.
1. Introduction
Every week, even daily, church services across the world are attended by millions 
of people engaging in various forms of communicative events in genres of religious 
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discourse.1 Despite affecting so many people, our knowledge of communication 
in religious discourse(s) is actually very limited (Wuthnow 1992). This study is 
concerned with preaching, a key genre of religious discourse, and with preachers’ 
use of non-assertive/tentative/non-specific language in contemporary sermons. 
Whereas many other discourses are well researched and well understood regard-
ing their appeal to language of this kind (e.g. academic discourse, Hyland 1998), 
little is known about the place of non-assertive/tentative/non-specific language 
in Christian sermonic discourse. When Kaltenböck et al. state that it is widely 
acknowledged that this kind of language plays “a crucial role in both spoken and 
written discourse” (2010: 1), we do not know whether, and how, this statement ap-
plies to preaching.
Many scholars of homiletics (the systematic study of preaching practices) 
claim that a ‘stance’ shift regarding the strength of assertions has taken place with-
in western preaching traditions over the last three to four decades (‘stance’ may be 
understood as the linguistic expression of attitude or commitment towards a prop-
osition, cf. Biber & Finegan 1989). Craddock notes that previous generations of 
preachers “ascended the pulpit to speak of eternal certainties, truths etched forever 
in granite of absolute reality, matters framed for proclamation, not for discussion” 
(2001: 13). During the second half of the 20th century the wide acceptance of the 
‘turn-to-the-listener’ preaching paradigm is assumed to have affected preaching 
in a direction away from this assertive baseline position (Allen 2004; Rose 1997), 
and a more explicit concern for the listener is evident in preaching. Recognizing 
this trend, Immink claims that “a more traditional assertive discourse is now re-
nounced, and a more indicative … way of speaking is welcomed” (2004: 101), al-
lowing for interpretations of the contents of preaching to be made by both preach-
ers and listeners. To date, these claims from within homiletics concerning the 
non-assertive appeal of preaching by Craddock (2001), Immink (2004) and others 
have not been confirmed by any empirical research into the language of sermons.
To address this research gap in religious discourse analysis (or what some 
might refer to as a gap in ‘descriptive’ or ‘empirical homiletics’), this study in-
vestigates how linguistic expressions ostensibly conveying non-assertiveness/un-
certainty/non-specificity and the like may be of service to preachers when they 
engage a contemporary church audience.
 (1) There was once a time when I was convinced that all this religious stuff was 
for wimps, weirdoes and fairies.
1. In the UK alone (the geographic location of this study) 4.9 million adults (10% of the UK 
adult population) are reported to attend church on a weekly basis (Ashworth & Farthing 2007).
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 (2) Your idea of Jesus’ Resurrection is possibly very different from mine, and that 
is fine.
Examples (1) and (2) highlight preachers engaged in “a rhetorical strategy that 
attenuates either the full semantic value of a particular expression …, or the full 
force of a speech act” (Fraser 2010: 15); this discursive and context-sensitive prac-
tice is standardly referred to as ‘hedging’ in the linguistics literature (e.g. Crompton 
1997; Fraser 2010; Hyland 1996, 1998, 2005; Kaltenböck et al. 2010; Lakoff 1972; 
Markkanen & Schröder 1997; Salager-Meyer 1994). With a focus on contempo-
rary preaching, this study offers an interesting new context for applied linguistics 
research in which to explore hedging as a discursive/pragmatic concept.
Drawing on sermon data from across three broadly defined preaching con-
texts (Anglican, Baptist and Roman-Catholic), the overarching purpose of the in-
vestigation is to establish the place of hedging in contemporary sermons where so 
much emphasis is placed on the listeners and the listeners’ role and space in the 
meaning-making process. It should be emphasized that the investigation is not 
so much a study about the concept of hedging, as it is a study about hedging as 
it applies in a particular kind of (religious) discourse. To this end, the paper asks 
three straightforward questions: (i) To what extent is preaching employed as a dis-
cursive resource during preaching; (ii) What form does hedging take in sermonic 
discourse; and (iii) What is preachers’ rationale for hedging?
The next two sections, Sections 2 and 3, provide useful background to the 
empirical investigation, first by describing the discourse context for (hedged) 
preaching, focusing on epistemological conditions imposed on the sermon, and 
then by reviewing some functionally oriented conceptions of hedging. The last 
part of Section 3 operationalizes hedging as applied to sermonic discourse; this 
operationalization is then integrated into a functional analytical model described 
in Section 4. In Section 5 I present the data used in the study and the qualitative 
and quantitative methods adopted to research hedging in sermons. Section 6 is 
divided into three sub-sections, each presenting research findings and discussion 
for each of the three research questions. The last section presents some short con-
cluding remarks.
2. A context for sermonic hedging
A basic assumption about hedging in this study is that it is a pragmatic phenom-
enon in the sense that it is evoked and constrained by the particular (social, cul-
tural, and rhetorical) context in which it operates, meaning that “members of dif-
ferent discourse communities use [hedges/hedging] to express meanings which 
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are particular to their own social and [discursive] objectives” (Hyland 1998: 157). 
This section provides a brief description of the context for hedging in sermons, 
with necessary emphasis placed on the epistemological assumptions and values 
underlying the preaching event since this is essential for our understanding of the 
conditions under which preachers hedge.
Preaching is best described as persuasive and performative social-communi-
cative action in a religious setting, a context that habitually defies characteriza-
tion of certain states of affairs as unequivocally true or not true. It is persuasive 
since the ultimate purpose of preaching is to persuasively engage with listeners 
and move them towards subjectively applied understanding and to affect indi-
vidual experience (Craddock 2001; Hogan 1999; Immink 2004; Rose 1997). It is 
performative (in a broad sense) because ‘moving listeners’ is not ultimately about 
an effect; instead it is intended to describe what preaching is doing (simultane-
ously to saying something) during the sermon. Much homiletic literature talks of 
preaching as striving for a present-tense experience (notwithstanding the fact that 
sermonic themes may be past-tense, and often are). Thus, whether the objective of 
preaching is kerygmatic (emphasizing the spirit of the Gospel), transformational 
(facilitating an experience of God), or conversational (sharing the responsibility 
of scripture interpretation) (Rose 1997), preaching language is performative, de-
liberately reflecting the language of the gospels where performative proclamation 
language is used for disclosing religious meaning.
Even if Wilson (1995: 264) talks of the preacher as “a proclaimer of truth”, 
the notion of truth and the communication of (un)certainty present major chal-
lenges to preachers. A Baptist preacher who was interviewed in connection with 
this study noted that for many people it is still natural to think that preaching is 
essentially about providing definitive answers to questions about faith.
A lot of people come to church believing that they will be given a simple truth, you 
know: ‘Say it as it is, brother! This is what you should believe!’ Those people are in 
for a real journey. In many ways preachers are in the business of uncertainty rather 
than certainty.
Most modern schools of preaching are adamant that “good preaching does not 
seek to win consent to a truth claim” (Immink 2004: 101); it is simply not what 
preaching is about. For truth in a sermonic context, McClure (2003: 70) notes that 
it “includes both the probable and the plausible”. The farthest one might go is to 
say that “truth is a tentative agreement, a momentary consensus, a synthetic sug-
gestion …”.
From within sociology, Wuthnow also stresses the “absence of any empiri-
cally verifiable knowledge” in religious contexts and says that “the existence of 
God cannot be proven; nor can many other claims about God …” (2012: 38). In 
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non-religious discourses it is usually possible to frame states of affairs as true or 
not true, but faith-based contexts standardly resist this kind of characterization 
and open up an epistemological continuum which must somehow be addressed 
communicatively.
The epistemology characteristic of the sermon is best described in terms of 
(degrees of) conviction rather than with reference to absolute certainty and actu-
ality (cf. Rose 1997). The kind of conviction referred to is effectively captured in 
this sermon excerpt, incidentally without any explicit linguistic features of hedg-
ing, from an Anglican preacher talking about the resurrection of Jesus:
 (3) We know it is true, because, because, well because we know it is true.
According to homiletics scholars it is best if preaching approaches truth and 
knowledge from the perspective of verisimilitude:
In many cases verisimilitude is the source of our truth claim rather than con-
firmed fact. … We are concerned with presenting at least two kinds of reality [and 
truth]. We certainly present life as most people know and experience it. We also 
present life as we know it to be true when seen from the perspective of faith. … A 
primary purpose of preaching is to move us all from the one perspective to this 
other one. (Wilson 1995: 267)
In encouraging listeners to embrace the perspective of faith, preachers should not 
shy away from the “tension of uncertainty” (Lose 2003: 62) that should character-
ize contemporary preaching. Preaching that carries this trademark of apparent 
uncertainty, Lose says, does not surrender truth, “but the ability to prove truth; not 
speech, but the right to have the last word; not faith, but unambiguous certainty” 
(2003: 62). In a similar vain, Allen (2010: 8) stresses that listeners in the pew “must 
have the freedom to assent or disagree with what is proclaimed, or it is not good 
news”.
Wuthnow notes that communication in religious discourse “evokes distinctive 
linguistic practices concerning the language of uncertainty” (2012: 38). A good 
reason to study hedging in sermonic discourse, then, is that it allows us to say 
something concrete about these ‘linguistic practices’ that preachers adopt to ne-
gotiate (un)certainty claims in sermons and preachers’ rationale for this kind of 
rhetoric.
In this study, it is argued that hedging is instrumental to addressing all four 
of the defining epistemological characteristics of contemporary preaching men-
tioned above (absence of empirical evidence, non-finality of statements, ambi-
guity, and freedom to (dis)agree). To this end, hedging is central to enable the 
performative move of listeners (and preachers) from a ‘life-as-we-know-it-from-
experience’-perspective to a ‘life-as-we-know-it-as-people-of-faith’-perspective 
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(cf. the quote from Wilson 1995 above). The move from one perspective to the 
other is subject to preachers’ successful persuasion of listeners, and consequently 
this move imposes certain constraints on sermonic communication — listeners 
must be made to understand what living a life in faith means, but an authorita-
tive and assertive approach to achieving this objective is unlikely to be successful 
(in view of the characteristics of contemporary preaching — what listeners are 
entitled to expect). Here, Hyland’s (1998, 2005) ‘adequacy conditions’ and ‘accept-
ability conditions’ for successful communication are helpful to understanding and 
explaining, a priori, a very general and fundamental function of hedging in ser-
monic discourse.
Adequacy and acceptability conditions involve speakers’ attending to a set of 
abstract conditions regarding what an audience recognizes as reasonable claims. 
Put simply, adequacy conditions pertain primarily to the content of the com-
munication: speakers need to make sure that their communicative contribution 
adheres to the content expectations of the community; therefore, they consider 
such aspects of the communicative situation as the background assumptions of 
the community involving ‘acknowledged’ or accepted truths as well as disputable 
points of interests. Acceptability conditions, on the other hand, have more to do 
with how the topic is communicated and how assumptions are negotiated between 
the speaker and the addressees. We have seen above indications of what the episte-
mological precepts of contemporary preaching are (cf. Allen 2010; Immink 2004; 
Lose 2003; McClure 2003), and in performing its most fundamental discursive 
functions, hedging, it is argued here, is used by preachers to avoid violating any 
adequacy and acceptability conditions constitutive of this sermonic epistemol-
ogy and, concurrently, to acknowledge listeners as sermonic conversationalists, 
as sharing in the preachers’ entertainment of a mental representation of what is 
communicatively acceptable and adequate during preaching.
3. Operationalizing hedging as an instance of sermonic metadiscourse
Notwithstanding the unencouraging claim by Crompton (1997) that an entirely 
satisfactory definition of hedging is lacking, several good attempts have been made 
to capture this elusive concept. In one of the groundbreaking works on hedging, 
Lakoff uses the concept in relation to “words whose job it is to make things fuzz-
ier or less fuzzy” (1972: 195). Most scholars acknowledge that later conceptions 
of hedging (notable contributions include Fraser 1975; Brown & Levinson 1978; 
Prince et al. 1982; Hubler 1983; Crompton 1997; Hyland 1998; Caffi 1999; Vande 
Kopple 2002 and Hyland 2005) represent a gradual move away from Lakoff ’s orig-
inal understanding that was primarily concerned with modifying membership in 
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a certain semantic category. Over time, definitions have come to emphasize hedg-
ing as having scope over propositions as well as being an inherent property of indi-
vidual expressions, meaning also that hedging is now more commonly conceived 
as a discursive and pragmatic phenomenon (Kaltenböck et al. 2010; Markkanen 
& Schröder 1997), more often than not analyzed from the point of view of what a 
particular linguistic expression is ‘doing’ at a certain point in a discourse (Hyland 
2005), and typically with reference to epistemic modality (Palmer 1990), eviden-
tiality (Chafe 1986), or communicative vagueness (Channell 1994) (hedging is 
widely assumed, e.g. Markkanen & Schröder 1997, to cut across all three of these 
dimensions).
In this pragmatic spirit, Salager-Meyer talks about hedges as “understatements 
used to convey (purposive) vagueness and tentativeness, and to make sentences 
more acceptable to the hearer/reader, thus increasing the chance of ratification and 
reducing the risk of negation” (1994: 150). From a similarly applied perspective, 
Hyland describes hedging as “the expression of tentativeness and possibility … a 
discoursal resource for expressing uncertainty, skepticism, and open-mindedness 
about one’s proposition” (1996: 433–434). In more recent work, Hyland (2005: 52, 
49) extends the definition of hedging to include expressions whose purpose it typi-
cally is to signal “plausible reasoning rather than certain knowledge”, and to rec-
ognize “alternative voices and viewpoints” [to] “withhold commitment and open 
up dialogue”. Importantly, Salager-Meyer (1994) and others have suggested that 
we view hedges not only as elements whose function it is to express uncertain-
ty or vagueness because speakers are actually uncertain or have vague notions: 
“the definition of hedges … goes beyond their mere association with speculation” 
(1994: 153). However, these sources also assert that these additional functions of 
hedging are poorly understood, particularly in discourses that have hitherto es-
caped the attention of discourse analysts, such as religious discourse (Wuthnow 
1992). This study directly addresses this lack of attention and contributes to devel-
oping an understanding of hedging as much more than a convenient cover term 
for expressed lack of confidence in a proposition and/or semantic fuzziness.
Hedging is taken in this study to be reflective of the social-interactive nature of 
preaching seen as ‘conversation’ between preachers and listeners (Allen 2004; Ädel 
& Mauranen 2010; Flottum & Dahl 2012) — this is a standard metaphor that most 
contemporary homiletics subscribe to. Following in the tradition of, for example, 
Vande Kopple (2002) and Hyland (1998; 2005), hedging is considered a metadis-
cursive phenomenon in the sense that it is used reflexively by preachers in relation 
to their own discourse “to achieve certain communicative purposes”, most funda-
mentally to negotiate interactional (rather than propositional) meanings during 
a sermon. Ontologically, these interactional meanings are assumptions regarding 
social-communicative ‘behavior’ as entertained between preachers and listeners 
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— in other words, adequacy and acceptability conditions as introduced above. It 
is the task of metadiscourse to address these conditions in various ways, meaning 
that metadiscursively framed communication is prompted by speakers’ awareness 
of and sensitivity to the unique conditions of any communicative situation (cf. 
Hyland 1998). Already Lakoff had noted that “hedges interact with felicity condi-
tions for utterances and with the rules of conversation” (1972: 213).
The metadiscursive act of hedging is highly heteroglossic, notwithstanding 
an appearance to the contrary in seemingly monologic discourses like preaching. 
Through metadiscourse, a meta-comment is made concerning things said or done 
in the discourse as part of a responsive/dialogic-discursive behavior in relation 
to propositions which may have been entertained/communicated previously (by 
the speaker or someone else) or propositions that may be entertained/commu-
nicated later on, as White & Sano (2006: 192) note: “the utterance operates [to] 
present the speaker as recognizing or engaged with other voices and other view-
points” concerning propositional content. It is this acknowledgement of listeners 
as conversational partners who share the preachers’ assumptions about a certain 
social-communicative behavior, and preachers’ attention to the dialogic nature of 
sermons that makes sermonic hedging highly interactional.
For the purposes of the present investigation into the place of hedging in 
preaching, hedging is thus operationalized as a metadiscursive means by which 
preachers overtly convey non-assertiveness/uncertainty/non-specificity motivat-
ed by a desire to negotiate certain interactional meanings and thus engage their 
listeners interpersonally in different ways and for different purposes. This con-
ception of hedging (which recalls parts of Hyland’s general definition of meta-
discourse, 2005: 37) lends itself well to a view of preaching as essentially being 
about social engagement between preacher and congregation, about postmodern 
congregation-centered hermeneutics instead of traditional persuasive proclama-
tion with little regard for listeners.
4. Functional model of analysis
Approaching hedging as a metadiscursive resource in preaching means acknowl-
edging that hedging is used by preachers to perform interpersonally motivated 
functions during the sermon event, that hedging language is doing something to 
further the sermonic relationship pertaining between preachers and their audi-
ences. The functional-analytical model adopted in this study is Hyland’s (2005) 
widely attested model of metadiscourse. This section provides an outline of the 
basis of the model, insofar as it is relevant for hedging, illustrating the merits of 
applying hedging operationalized as metadiscourse to sermonic discourse.
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Hyland’s starting point is a view of metadiscourse as “a system of meanings 
realized by an open-ended set of linguistic items” (2005: 37) (thereby firmly estab-
lishing his model within Systemic Functional Linguistics). This open-endedness 
certainly applies to hedges, which may acquire their hedging property “only in 
actual instances of realization” (2005: 37). Fundamental in Hyland’s model for 
analyzing hedging functionally is therefore to establish what counts as a hedge, 
only thereafter is it possible to decide what particular role the hedge plays. Hyland 
(2005: 38, adapted) proposes three basic conditions which must be met, namely 
that
1. hedging is distinct from propositional aspects of discourse;
2. hedging refers to aspects of the discourse that embody speaker-listener inter-
action;
3. hedging refers only to relations which are internal to the discourse.
The three conditions are essentially three different ways of saying that metadis-
cursive hedging is interactional, i.e. concerned with the discursive relationship 
between preachers and listeners. The uses of the expression possible in (4) and (5) 
illustrate how these conditions may be applied analytically to distinguish metadis-
cursive hedging from other aspects of communication.
 (4) It is possible for God to be, to act, to make a difference in all aspects of life if 
you let him pour his Holy Spirit over you.
 (5) It is possible that Jesus’ words apply strictly to his own glorious Resurrection, 
but he may also have been anticipating our Resurrection in him.
Hyland (2005) establishes an admittedly vague defining line between propositions 
and metadiscourse, or in his own words “things in the world [what the text says 
about the world] and things in the discourse [the communicator’s position vis à 
vis the text and the audience]” (2005: 38); however this vagueness is necessary in 
a model where metadiscourse is itself considered “a crucial element of … mean-
ing” (2005: 41). Hyland continues: “like propositional discourse, metadiscourse 
conveys the [speaker’s] intended meaning” (2005: 41), though rather than propo-
sitional in nature, metadiscursive meaning is interactional, recognizing the listen-
ers in various ways. Thus, when the presence of a certain expression is discur-
sively motivated by the speaker’s intention to convey something about the world, 
then it may be called propositional; when the presence of a certain expression 
is discursively motivated by the speaker’s interpersonal concerns, then it may be 
called metadiscursive. On this view, it is easy to distinguish the two uses of pos-
sible in utterances (4) and (5). In the former, the expression helps the audience 
to conceive a world with a caring God; here possible is propositional. In the latter 
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utterance, possible is used by the preacher to directly address the audience, helping 
the preacher to relate the message/proposition to the specific (dually hermeneutic) 
context provided by the sermon, also taking into account the relative status of the 
listeners as dictated by the contemporary preaching situation (which would be 
different from the status of listeners/readers in other discourse contexts) (Hyland 
2005: 41).
The uses of possible in (4) and (5) are yet again different when Hyland’s sec-
ond condition for metadiscursive hedging is considered. In (5), the expression 
functions interactionally in at least two ways: first, it opens up an interpretative 
space where some listeners may wish to agree with the proposition and others 
may interpret Jesus’ words in a different way (as suggested by the interpretative 
‘option’ in the clause that follows, which is incidentally also hedged). Second, this 
epistemic adjective manifests the preacher’s attention to the acceptability condi-
tions of sermonic discourse (e.g. that sermons should open up for different Biblical 
interpretations), and, consequently, his recognition of the listeners as sharing in 
this understanding of the nature of sermonic conversation (conveying something 
like “I know what is expected of me in this situation and you know this too — we 
are all members of the same social community”); Hyland frames this as the com-
municator’s “sensitivity to the context of the discourse”. The use of possible in (4) 
does not evoke any preacher-listener interaction in this way; it does not do any-
thing discursively apart from constituting part of the asserted proposition.
For Hyland’s third condition of metadiscursive hedging, “the determining fac-
tor is … the objectivity of the event, whether the outcome is related to the speaker’s 
assessment of possibility about something happening or to external circumstances 
which might make it possible” (2005: 48). In (4) the preacher is speaking encour-
agingly about what listeners may do to invite God into their lives (“let him pour 
his Holy Spirit over you” — this is the necessary external circumstance), and what 
presents itself as a real prospect (the outcome) if they do (“for God to be, to act, 
to make a difference …”). In this sermon utterance, possible “is concerned with 
the ability or volition of the subject of the sentence [God]” (i.e. a case of dynamic 
modality as conceived by Palmer 1990: 36). This may be contrasted with (5) where 
the preacher instead uses possible with epistemic modal intentions (Palmer 1990), 
to leave options (‘outcomes’) open for listeners (thereby indicating his assessment 
of possibilities).
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5. Materials and methods
The materials used in this study came in two forms, sermon manuscripts and tran-
scribed preacher interviews, and both qualitative and quantitative methods were 
used to address the three research questions posed in the Introduction.
5.1 Preaching data from different denominations
50 Easter sermon manuscripts each from the Church of England, the Baptist 
Church and the Roman-Catholic Church (150 sermons in total, corresponding to 
189,239 words) provided a small but indicative sample of contemporary sermonic 
discourse. Only one manuscript from any one preacher was included in the three 
samples; this was done to avoid skewing of the data because of pronounced per-
sonal preaching (and hedging) styles. The choice to use Easter sermon manuscripts 
only was because I wanted there to be a common theme to all the sermons. All the 
sermons were preached at some point during the period 2005 to 2011. Table 1 
presents an overview of the data. The main reason for choosing these three de-
nominations was to get a reasonably representative spread across well-established 
Christian preaching traditions.2 It is interesting to speculate whether denomina-
tional affiliation in any way affects preachers’ strategies when employing hedging 
language. A desire to tap any differences between preaching traditions concerning 
hedging strategies therefore runs as an undercurrent throughout the investigation.
Table 1. Overview of sermonic data used in this study
Anglican Baptist Catholic All churches
Number of sermon texts    50    50    50    150
Total no. of words (tokens) 64439 76751 48049 189239
Mean length of sermons (tokens)  1289  1532   961   1262
5.2 Data analysis
The qualitative and quantitative analyses of the data proceeded in four basic but 
necessary stages with the purpose to (i) explore the material, (ii) identify potential 
hedging forms and functions, (iii) validate the findings, and (iv) provide quantifi-
cational perspectives.
2. There is considerable theological diversity, with direct implications for sermonic discourse, 
within all three of these denominations; this is perhaps most clearly represented in the Church 
of England, which is nominally Anglican, yet extremely heterogeneous across the confessional 
and liturgical spectrum.
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5.2.1 Close reading — inductive discovery of hedges
A first step in the qualitative analysis, guided by inductive discovery of the ser-
mon data, involved a close reading (Martin 2000) of ten sermon manuscripts from 
each of the three sermon samples. During a careful reading of the manuscripts, 
any linguistic expression interpreted to have some hedging function (as defined 
above) was identified; larger bits of discourse such as whole clauses, sentences or 
more extensive pieces of discourse were not considered. The reading resulted in 
the identification of a number of linguistic forms assumed to have a hedging func-
tion, and, with the help of the surrounding context, an interpretation (sometimes 
very speculative) concerning the preacher’s rationale for hedging at that particular 
point in the sermon, i.e. an interpretation of the discourse function of hedging.
5.2.2 Preacher interviews
Additional qualitative perspectives were subsequently added to the analysis in 
the form of reflections and responses from semi-structured interview questions 
(Drever 2003) from 11 of the practicing preachers who contributed manuscripts, 
involving at least three preachers from each denomination. The preachers were 
asked mostly open-ended questions about preaching language practices in general 
as well as specific questions concerning the use of hedges in their own manuscript. 
In cases where the preachers had submitted more than one manuscript all the 
manuscripts submitted were considered during the interviews even if they did not 
form part of the sample.
The interviews were in part methodologically inspired by Lewin (2005), who 
prompted her informants (scientific authors) about the pragmatic function of 
hedges in their own scientific discourse. Her method of asking authors themselves 
was a novel one, at least in terms of using a systematic approach and looking at ex-
tended discourse. In the case of the preacher interviews, I was interested in learn-
ing about preachers’ rationale for using one or the other type of hedge, and their 
reasons for hedging. Guided by the way Lewin (2005) phrased her questions, I 
asked the preachers two questions:
1. Can you point me to any place in your sermon where you feel yourself that you 
tone down a statement/express yourself tentatively?
2. Why did you tone down your statement/express yourself in this way?
Just like Lewin, I deliberately avoided the term ‘hedge’ because of its potential 
pejorative connotations regarding avoidance of responsibility for statements, and 
because it might confuse the interviewees. In most cases, preachers pointed me to 
wordings in the manuscript that I had already identified provisionally, but in some 
rare cases preachers identified wordings that I had not immediately interpreted as 
performing a hedging function. Regardless, we then discussed their rationale for 
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toning down the statement in each of the cases. This process led to the confirma-
tion, and in many cases also the rejection, of several of the discourse functions 
suggested during the close reading.
5.2.3 Searching for, analyzing and quantifying hedges in sermons
The qualitative process was then followed by a quantitative investigation. The list 
of hedging forms identified through the close reading and as a result of the inter-
views was compared to a list of words with potential hedging functions provided 
in Hyland (2005). Despite the claim by Markkanen & Schröder (1997: 6) that “no 
clear-cut lists of hedging expressions are possible”, previous research into hedg-
ing has taught us that certain specific linguistic expressions commonly perform a 
hedging function. This kind of ‘listing’ of hedges is not for the sake of listing itself, 
but allows scholars to explore functional as well as distributional aspects of lin-
guistic expressions which may perform a hedging function; this makes sense when 
the ultimate purpose is to better understand hedging as communicative behavior 
in certain discourse contexts.
Since the category of hedges is widely considered to be open-ended, Hyland’s 
(2005) list is as good a starting point as any other, even if his list is reflective mostly 
of hedges in academic discourse. In cases where Hyland’s list did not include an 
item that I had identified through the close reading or during the interviews, that 
item was added to his original list. In some cases items from Hyland’s list did not 
appear in the 30 manuscripts that were used in the close reading (e.g. the epistemic 
adjective probable were not used a single time in these manuscripts). For this rea-
son a back-check from Hyland’s list was done on the complete sermon samples 
— any item (n = 21) from the original Hyland-list that did not appear at all in the 
sermon samples was removed from the combined list. This systematic approach 
meant that it was possible to identify a reasonably good number of linguistic forms 
(n = 42) as hedging candidates in sermons. However, it should be stressed that 
the objective of the study was to investigate different patterns of occurrence of 
hedges (cf. the expressed objective of Hyland & Tse 2004 for their study on meta-
discourse) and to give an indication of the place of hedging in preaching — the 
study does not claim to be comprehensive in the sense that all linguistic elements 
that could possibly perform a hedging function were identified.
Searches for all the hedging forms on the list of hedging elements were then 
made in the three sermon samples using freely downloadable concordance soft-
ware, AntConc (Anthony 2014). A first ‘inventory’ of potential hedging expres-
sions in the sermon samples resulted in a total of 1,987 returns. All returns then 
needed to be analyzed manually, using the analytical principles illustrated in 
Section 4, to ensure that they qualified as hedging metadiscourse. Hyland stresses 
the importance of this manual process: “analysts must always examine each item 
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individually to determine its function” (2005: 24). In addition, potential hedges in 
quoted material in the sermons had to be eliminated.
In order to confirm the reliability of these analytical principles as applied to 
sermonic data, the principles were confirmed by two research colleagues from 
other disciplines (neither of them have any formal training in linguistics; one is 
a native speaker of English, the other is very close to native-speaker competent). 
After being introduced to the concept of metadiscourse, the concept of hedging, 
and how to identify metadiscursive hedges (here we looked at very clear examples 
in context and the conditions in Section 4), they were given 100 concordance lines 
each (randomly selected by taking every 10th instance in the combined sample 
of 1,987 candidate items). The raters were also given ‘context’ in the form of five 
sentences before and after the sentence that included the target concordance line. I 
then analyzed the same sub-sample as the raters before reviewing their responses. 
In identifying those instances to be eliminated (because they were either not used 
metadiscursively or did not meet the definition of a hedge) we agreed in 92% and 
94% of the cases respectively. This was thought to be sufficient to confirm the prin-
ciples for analysis. After I had manually analyzed the entire sample and eliminated 
any non-qualifiers, the total number of hedges in the sermon sample was deter-
mined to be 1,627.
6. Results and discussion
This section is divided into three parts, each of which is devoted to one of the 
three research questions. The main findings can be summarized in the following 
way: Overall, hedging occurs with average total frequencies ranging between 7.5 
and 12.2 hedges per 1,000 words of preaching. Interestingly, Catholic preaching 
uses significantly less hedging than Anglican and Baptist preaching. Preachers rely 
almost exclusively on transparent/traditional forms of hedging manifested by in-
definite expressions, modal auxiliary verbs, semi-auxiliary verbs, and epistemic 
(modal) adjectives and adverbs. Finally, while it was possible to identify a multi-
tude of metadiscursive functions of hedging in sermonic discourse (ten of which 
are discussed in here), it was not possible to correlate a specific hedging function 
with a hedging form in any consistent way. The results presented are consistent 
with the tenets of the turn-to-the-listener preaching paradigm and also confirm 
that hedging is a discourse-dependent many-faceted phenomenon.
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6.1 Distribution of hedges in sermonic discourse
The frequencies reported in Table 2 confirm the view that hedging is a central 
concern in contemporary, turn-to-the-listener preaching. A total of 1,627 cases 
of hedging were found in the collected sample (189,239 words). Anglican preach-
ing uses 12.1 hedges/1,000 words of preaching; Baptist preaching uses 11.5 hedg-
es/1,000 words of preaching; Roman-Catholic preaching uses 7.7 hedges/1,000 
words of preaching.
Table 2. Distribution of hedges in various text samples; numbers normalized to occur-
rences per 1,000 words
Anglican 
preaching
Baptist 
preaching
Roman-Catholic 
preaching
Denominations 
combined
Hedges/1,000 words 12.1 11.5 7.7 11.5
For every 1,000 words of preaching, and assuming that preachers speak at a nor-
mal speaking rate of 160 words per minute, preachers use some kind of hedging 
device once every 32 seconds.
It seems Catholic preaching uses less hedging than both Baptist and Anglican 
preaching. This is confirmed by chi-square analysis of denominational differences 
pertaining between hedges. These differences are significant: X-squared = 64.72, 
df = 8, p-value < 0.01, meaning that the markedly lower frequency of hedges in the 
Catholic sample is not attributable to chance. Closer examination of the standard-
ized residuals confirms that hedges are underrepresented in the Catholic sample 
and overrepresented in the Anglican and the Baptist samples. Since there is no 
‘norm’ to compare these frequencies to, it is interesting to speculate about the rea-
sons for (i) the low(er) frequency of hedging in Catholic preaching, and (ii) the 
high(er) frequency of hedging in Anglican and Baptist preaching. In this respect it 
is worth noting that “the language of uncertainty and faith is … heavily dependent 
on religious institutions and teachings, traditions, and ritual practices of these in-
stitutions” (Wuthnow 2012: 38).
A tendency for Catholic preachers to hedge less is consistent with the view of 
authority in the Roman-Catholic Church; interpretation, and to some extent there 
is an interpretative/hermeneutic component present in all preaching, is grounded 
in the Church’s teaching authority, the magisterium, widely recognized as a major 
source of religious influence and truth (Ratzinger & Schönborn 1994). Teaching 
and doctrine has been carefully “traditioned” (Ratzinger & Schönborn 1994: 78) 
in the Catholic Church over centuries and there is thus potentially less interpreta-
tive and dialogic space for preachers, and for listeners, to inhabit, and this may be 
manifested by a lower incidence of hedges. Two of the three Catholic preachers 
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interviewed expressed a distinct feeling of trust in the continuity of the magiste-
rium and were hesitant about a need to express themselves in uncertain terms, as 
reflected by this comment.
In most cases there is no need to express uncertainty because you can always turn 
to the church’s teaching. I am then expressing an ecclesial faith and that is enough. 
There are times when we just have to depend on the church. That continuity is im-
portant. What I could do is say that I don’t understand something.
The other end of the ecclesial spectrum (in this study) is occupied by the Baptist 
Church, which typically tends to renounce doctrinal authority, grounding truth of 
its faith in biblical revelation and the belief that every individual Christian (rather 
than the church) has been endowed with the ability to interpret the Bible (Maring 
& Hudson 2012). In this much wider interpretative space, hedges may play a differ-
ent, more central, role. To some extent, the same is true for the Church of England 
where the preachers’, and the listeners’, right to individually interpret the Bible is 
widely acknowledged. Comments from both Baptist and Anglican preachers con-
firm these typical positions and also suggest that this may indeed be a reason for a 
higher incidence of hedging with these two denominations.
I would feel that I was intellectually dishonest if I did not sometimes express myself 
tentatively. I would even go as far as saying that I am honor bound through my 
Baptist ministry to do that — what I offer is after all my interpretation. [Baptist]
I always, always feel a need to express myself tentatively. I never make theological 
claims, that I believe some people do, about forgiveness, hell, and things like that. 
We are really lucky in the sense that the Church of England does not have a strong 
body of doctrine to which I must give assent and relate in my preaching. [Anglican]
Interestingly, during our discussion concerning the use of tentative language, but 
without being asked to make any comparison with other denominations, one of 
the Anglican informants contrasted preaching in the Church of England with 
preaching in the Catholic Church, saying that:
The Church of England is incredibly liberal when it comes to preachers expressing 
their own view. We do not speak as representatives of the church as Catholic priests 
do. In our context, when you express ‘your take’ on things, which would be a lot more 
common than saying something about the church’s position, then I think expressing 
yourself tentatively is inevitable.
6.2 Hedging forms in sermonic discourse
The systematic process involving close reading of the sermon manuscripts (the au-
thor’s identification of hedges) supplemented by the interviews (the preachers’ own 
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identification of hedges) reveals that preachers almost exclusively rely on transpar-
ent, i.e. traditional and previously recognized, forms of hedging. On virtually all 
occasions when I asked preachers to “point me to any place in your sermon where 
you feel yourself that you tone down a statement/express yourself tentatively” they 
indicated places that were metadiscursively framed by a hedging form(s) which 
was among those that I had identified myself. While this provides support to the 
analysis, it is surprising that so little mention was made of more subtle, less trans-
parent, forms of hedging (this was clearly the case in Lewin’s 2005 study).
The only hedging form that stands out as not being transparent (to the analyst) 
is various statements involving the communicative verb pray, as in (6).
 (6) I pray that you all follow this example of love.
Several preachers wished to attach tentativeness to this verb, saying, for example, 
“it is a tentative way of encouraging listeners” or “it is the Church’s way of express-
ing hope and anticipation, and it takes away the forcefulness of a statement; having 
said that, it is a really churchy way of saying something”. These remarks obviously 
recall Fraser’s definition of hedges as expressions that “take away the full force of 
a speech act” (2010: 15).
A concordance search shows that five grammatical categories of hedges stand 
out as particularly prevalent in sermonic discourse, none of them surprising as far 
as standard expressions of hedges are concerned: indefinite expressions, modal 
auxiliary verbs, semi-auxiliary verbs, modal adjectives and adverbs, and the lexi-
cal modal expression I think. Table 3 shows the distribution of the most frequent 
hedging forms of these categories of hedges. What is interesting, though, is that 
some forms recall practices characteristic of written discourse rather than spoken 
discourse.
Table 3. Distribution of the most frequently occurring hedges (raw numbers)
Hedge Anglican Baptist Catholic Combined frequency 
(% of total no. hedges)
some, someone, something, 
sometimes
123 134 53 310 (19%)
may  71  89 51 211 (13%)
might  57  87 37 181 (11%)
seem(s)  70  53 21 144 (9%)
perhaps  51  40 21 112 (7%)
possible/-ly  29  28 18  75 (5%)
I think  36  14 18  68 (4%)
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By far the most frequent hedge is some, and derived forms of that indefinite ex-
pression; the combined frequency of some-form hedges amounts to 19% of all the 
hedges found in the data. The example in (7) is representative.
 (7) In modern parlance some might say that the Gospel writers were spin-
doctors for their faith.
Prototypically, some-constructions introduce an indefinite variable (Huddleston 
& Pullum 2002) or an element of vagueness (Channell 1994; Cutting 2007), mak-
ing propositions deliberately imprecise or ambiguous in some respect. The finding 
that vagueness structures are frequent in preaching suggests that, in this respect at 
least, preaching practice is at odds with homiletic advice concerning language use 
in sermons. Broadus & Weatherspoon (1944: 244), in one of the milestone works 
in homiletics of the last century, emphasize “clearness and perspicuity” in preach-
ing. The authors urge preachers to “render it not merely possible that the people 
should understand … but impossible that they should misunderstand” (1944: 96). 
This is accomplished, according to Broadus & Weatherspoon by using words “that 
exactly express [preachers’] thoughts [and] terms ought to be precise so that the 
expression and the idea correspond, neither of them containing anything which 
the other does not contain”.
Some is a typical feature of spoken communication/conversation (Biber et al. 
1999; Thornbury & Slade 2006), and in this way its deployment in preaching proj-
ects a kind of imagined conversation, in many ways a means in itself since preach-
ing should be conversation-like (Buttrick 1987) and for preachers who are anxious 
to ‘sound’ conversational, it would be an incentive to flavor their language with 
expressions so typical of spoken interaction.
A desire to sound conversational may be reflected also in the relatively high 
occurrence of the ‘mental verb’ construction I think, commonly used in dialogue 
and face-to-face conversation (Aijmer 1997; Simon-Vandenbergen 2000). I think 
is either used parenthetically or with a (sometimes suppressed) that-clause com-
plement as in (8). I think indexes a semantic domain of uncertainty and weak 
commitment (e.g. Aijmer 1997) and, more rarely, authoritative deliberation 
(Simon-Vandenbergen 2000). Very often, I think appears in conjunction with 
other hedging devices, as in example (8) where the expressions might, and assume 
cumulatively amplify the hedging force:
 (8) The four Gospels are not consistent about who was present and how near 
they were but I think we might reasonably assume that the artist intends 
them to represent the three Mary’s.
The modal verbs may (9) and might (10), in their epistemic senses, together ac-
count for nearly 25% of the total number of occurrences of hedging items.
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 (9) Believing in Jesus may be an intangible and indefinite thing.
 (10) This year we might feel our experience is closest to the Emmaus disciples; 
next year we might feel more like Mary Magdalene. The year after that it 
might be something completely different.
According to Hyland (1998: 116) both forms are standardly used to “indicate a 50–
50 assessment of possibilities” and they are par excellence markers of the domain 
of epistemic modality. If preachers desire to sound conversational the frequency 
for might ought to be higher than that of may; might is more common in spoken 
discourse (Biber et al. 1999), but the apparent balance between the two forms may 
be attributable to the fact that the investigation is based on manuscripts written 
to be spoken.
The semi-auxiliary verb seem, referred to by Hyland (1998) as an epistemic-
evidential verb, typically signals preachers’ arriving at a tentative conclusion on 
the basis of an inferential process, as in example (11) where the preacher involves 
the listeners in the inferential process and indirectly points them to the ‘evidence’: 
“go see for yourself — the Bible talks of a man dressed in white”.
 (11) In the Bible, white clothing is usually what someone would wear in the 
presence of God, so it seems that this man is a messenger from God.
The high incidence of seem in the sample is somewhat surprising. According to 
Biber et al. (1999) seem is a typical feature of written academic discourse, and 
homiletics (e.g. Buttrick 1987; Craddock 2010) cautions preachers against adopt-
ing an essayistic and formal tone when they preach, lest sermonic discourse sound 
academic.
The basic function of the epistemic adjectives/adverbs perhaps (12) and pos-
sible/ly (13) is to show “the doubt of the proposition” (Biber et al. 1999: 868) and to 
reduce “categorical commitment” (Hyland 1998: 130–131) respectively.
 (12) Perhaps like Mary Magdalene and the other disciples, we find it difficult to 
believe.
 (13) Possibly, we will become just that little bit more ready to respond.
Strong opinions have been voiced in the homiletic literature about the use of ad-
jectives and adverbs in sermons. One extreme position is occupied by Buttrick 
who recommends that preachers avoid unnecessary adjectives, which do little but 
“cloy”, and adverbs, since they add “extra beats” leading to a language that is “quite 
unnatural” in preaching (1987: 218–219). McClure (2007: 68) advocates that ad-
jectives and adverbs are “used sparingly” and Eslinger (2002: 31) warns that the 
language of preaching can be “eroded“ by adjectives and adverbs. Eslinger goes as 
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far as saying that these words, “rob … the hearers of their own judgments regard-
ing the ideas” in the sermon. While recommendations of this kind may be appro-
priate regarding the use of adjectives/adverbs in colorful descriptions, epistemic 
adjectives and adverbs of the kind in (12) and (13) do exactly the opposite: they 
open up dialogue and invite listeners to form their own judgments. This would 
be one area where the current analysis could serve to inform homiletic theory to 
make recommendations more nuanced. What is more, on the topic of adjectives 
and adverbs, homiletic advice appears, again, to be at odds with preaching prac-
tices, as suggested by the comment from this Anglican preacher:
I happen to love a well-placed adjective or adverb, it adds nuance to what you say, 
makes your language come alive in interesting ways.
6.3 Functions of hedging in preaching
An interesting finding from the interviews was that on many occasions, preach-
ers failed to identify what I interpreted to be obvious instances of toning down of 
statements, suggesting that the main function of much hedging has little or noth-
ing to do with preachers’ epistemic confidence in the qualified proposition. There 
is, instead, indicative evidence of a multitude of other (meta)discursive functions 
of hedges in sermonic discourse. For reasons of space, the discussion here is lim-
ited to ten of the functions identified. While some of the functions have a gen-
eral communicative value, others are clearly unique to a preaching context and 
have consequently not been discussed before in the research literature. It should 
be noted that no clear correlations between preachers’ self-reported rationale for 
hedging and denominational affiliation could be identified.
A first, general, interpersonal function of hedging, which is also evident in 
contemporary preaching, is to allow for alternative interpretations of states of 
affairs, thereby opening up a (tacit) dialogue with listeners. In example (14) the 
Baptist preacher offers his interpretation (indexed by possible) of the place in the 
Bible they have just read together but together with the added-on question, an 
invitation is extended to the listeners to challenge the interpretation and take a 
leading role in the meaning-making themselves.
 (14) It is possible that Jesus was upset and sad. Or what do you think?
The tentativeness introduced by the hedge and the open question emphasizes that 
the preacher is on a faith journey, in similar fashion to his listeners, assuming 
the position of a ‘student of faith’, asking questions and exploring possibilities, 
rather than assuming the position of ‘teacher’ and providing answers to questions 
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about faith. In this respect, hedging also highlights an element of inclusiveness, 
eradicating ‘boundaries’ between preachers and listeners.
The hedging in (14) also highlights another metadiscursive function crucial 
to contemporary preaching, namely an inherent invitation to listeners to explore 
further on their own, as expressed by the Baptist pastor when we discussed this 
example from his sermon:
There are parts where you can be really firm, and there are other parts where you say 
‘Look this is my understanding; the best interpretation I can get to is this.’ That would 
encourage people to look at it for themselves.
Both these first two functions of hedging (pointing to alternatives/dialogue, and 
inviting to explore further) are consistent with homiletic advice that “a sermon 
must be open to many interpretations and hearers are invited to complete the ser-
mon” (Immink 2004: 100).
In the process of listening to the sermon and in completing the sermon, listen-
ers are entitled to experience doubt, and another function of hedging is to recog-
nize doubt among listeners. In example (15) doubt is arguably thematic in this 
part of the sermon, but according to the Catholic preacher, a real effect of using the 
words may and maybe in this way is that they act ‘catalytically’ upon that theme.
 (15) We may have lost the old certainties that we could hold when we weren’t 
challenged every day by a diverse sea of faiths and of moral ambiguity. 
Maybe we have got it wrong.
Commenting further on the hedging the preacher expressed the view that:
You have to acknowledge that there are huge amounts of doubt around and the 
people in Church are not immune from this and nor is the preacher himself. … By 
being cautious in this way I can acknowledge the listeners’ feeling of uncertainty. 
Mind you, the ‘maybe’ there is highly rhetorical — I then go on to assert that we are 
in fact right, but the effect of acknowledgement, however hypothetical it may seem, 
is important.
The ‘mysterious’ nature of faith is a recurrent theme in much homiletic literature. 
Buttrick (1987: 261–262) declares that “preaching speaks of the Mystery of God 
[and] interprets a being-saved community within a mysterious human world”. 
When faced with these mysteries, preachers must sometimes assume a humble at-
titude and recognize their failure to understand something completely — this is 
another function of hedging, and it goes hand in hand with contemporary listen-
ers’ general rejection of authority that is so characteristic in turn-to-the-listener 
preaching. In this postmodern situation preachers are denied the right to have 
the last word, and hedging can be seen as a means for preachers to recognize a 
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reconstructed notion of authority, and to de-emphasize their own perceived au-
thority — contemporary preachers renounce the power to command listeners to 
do something or even think in a specific way; instead they wish to move listeners 
towards subjectively applied understanding and to affect individual experience. 
This desire came out quite strongly in several of the interviews, but was expressed 
most clearly by this Anglican preacher when we discussed his use of might in (16) 
and the framing of the utterance by the explicit acknowledgement It is difficult to 
understand:
I cannot claim to understand everything God teaches us, and for this reason I some-
times feel a strong need to be tentative about what I say. Many people may see me as 
an authority, but really I am not. I am in search of truth as much as they are, and 
while I may be able to help them on the journey, they must draw on their own experi-
ences and find their own answers.
 (16) It is difficult to understand what Paul is getting at. Might he be implying that 
turning away from sin is the answer?
Another apparent reason for preachers to hedge is that sometimes it is absolutely 
necessary to flag something as uncertain because all there is to fall back on is 
hermeneutics, so there is no real way of ’knowing’. When preachers hedge as a 
result of striving for accurate biblical interpretation, they standardly do it to in-
dicate that there is theological (exegetical) disagreement concerning something. 
Thus, the rationale on these occasions (as well) has nothing to do with preachers’ 
epistemic confidence in the proposition; rather their only option is to hedge. The 
sermon excerpt in (17) is a good example of hedging with this motive.
 (17) Bible scholars have offered various ways of interpreting the reading this 
morning. Jesus’ words may be taken to refer to Christians only, i.e. people of 
faith. Alternatively ….
Jesus’ words may indeed be taken to refer to Christians only, but his words may 
equally well be taken to refer to other groups of people, and the preacher then goes 
on to point to two alternative interpretations. Here the hedge effectively sets up the 
interpretative scene, but the rationale is not to point to alternative interpretations 
that listeners may have (that is another function of hedging, see above), but to point 
to alternatives offered by biblical exegesis (often Bible scholars). Commenting on 
his use of may in (17), this view was offered by a Baptist preacher:
When I come to Scripture, which is a fundamental source, there are times where 
Scripture does not bear a clear witness, where either it is incomplete, or it may ap-
pear contradictory. In that case I would have to be intellectually honest and offer 
different viewpoints or alternatives that I know of and say that I am not going to say 
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which is true, because I don’t think I can. Here ‘may’ signals that there are alterna-
tive ways of interpreting Scripture.
Yet another rationale for hedging is exemplified by (18).
 (18) Perhaps you can do whatever little is in your power to change the lives of 
these people.
Here the hedging by the adverb perhaps highlights a desire on the part of the 
preacher not to impose on the listeners. Generally, preachers tend to want to 
avoid imposing on listeners, so a desire not to be perceived as dogmatic, moral-
ist, or as passing ethical judgment or, as in this case, a desire not to be perceived 
as ordering people about, incentivizes preachers to hedge. Allen (2010: 8) stresses 
that contemporary listeners “must be able to ‘apply’ the word spoken to their own 
lives in their own ways without it being dictated or there is no freedom”. Similarly, 
Wilson (2004: 123) says that “a preacher must not dogmatize or pontificate, but 
be able to listen and raise issues”. Speaking about the excerpt in (18) this Catholic 
preacher expressed that:
People today, my listeners, are burdened by so much: personal bereavement, prob-
lems of the heart, feelings of insecurity or of being insufficient. While I sometimes 
have to tell them unpleasant things, it is not my desire to add to that burden by 
ordering or telling them what to do or what to feel or believe. On this occasion I 
wanted to encourage them to do something for the refugees, but I wanted to lighten 
it up somewhat.
Constructing ethos is another dimension of hedging in preaching. The ethos-
generating power of hedging operates by adding to the credibility of the preacher. 
Ethos/credibility as a dimension of tentative language was a point that was reiter-
ated by several of the preachers during the interviews. The Anglican preacher who 
is the source of (19) said the following by way of explaining his choice of wording 
(I think…):
That is just a way for me to communicate a credible message that does not focus too 
much on what I believe the Christian faith is like — I am conscious of not coming 
across as too firm — I need them to see me as a humble servant of God. Only that 
way can I make them see things in a potentially new light.
 (19) I think that the Christian faith is like this, especially at Easter.
When preachers explicitly acknowledge uncertainty this projects an unassuming 
character on the part of the preacher (‘I do not tell you what to think, believe, 
feel etc.’). According to Allen (1992: 104) this is a way to be honest as “it adds 
to the credibility of the preacher; it avoids coming to a premature conclusion”. 
Expressing uncertainty, presenting different viewpoints on a controversial topic 
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in a sermon, also adds to the credibility of the sermon, rather than the preacher, 
Allen (1992: 104–105) says. While it might seem difficult to disentangle the cred-
ibility of the preacher from the credibility of the sermon, this happens quite readily 
on occasions when sermons are published, for example in a parish magazine, or 
online, and then becomes a communicative entity separate from the preacher.
Much homiletic literature advocates the use of everyday language in preach-
ing, underlining “the familiar conversational quality [of sermons] so they don’t 
become classroom lectures” (Waznak 1998: 117), stressing that preaching essen-
tially should be a conversation about the lives of the listeners. While it may be 
difficult to engage the congregation in traditional conversation on the pattern of 
a dialogue with turn-taking (although that happens in some churches), if preach-
ers want to heed such advice, it is in their interest at least to make the sermon 
sound like an attempt at conversation. To some degree, hedging helps preachers to 
address this general stylistic objective during preaching, to mimic conversation. 
When I discussed example (20) with a Baptist preacher it was revealed that one 
objective of using hedges was that it helps him project a conversation.
 (20) I think that verse 19 shows us a touch of Jesus’ humor when he asked them 
that question.
I try to preach the way I am speaking to you now. I want my preaching to sound like 
a conversation between people. In my view, the inclusion of expressions like ‘I think’ 
add a certain conversational flavor to the sermon, I think I sound a bit more chatty 
that way.
A sermon shaped by the turn-to-the-listener preaching paradigm commonly as-
sumes various forms of a narrative structure, often involving an inductive retrac-
ing of experience, moving “from the specifics of lived experience to general claims” 
(Allen 2010: 8–9). If the narrative does not involve the listeners directly, preachers 
are anxious to make them part of the story in other ways — another function of 
hedging in preaching is inviting listeners to be part of the sermon story.
The sermon excerpt in (21) is a good example of this hedging function. The 
preacher uses a ‘life story’ of a young adult living in a neighboring parish as a 
starting point and backdrop for the sermon as a whole. Listeners are told about 
the young man’s early childhood, how many of his dreams were shattered, and the 
young man’s chaotic family situation. At the point where the three statements in 
(21) are uttered, the preacher consciously shifts the focus away from the boy of the 
example to the listeners and applies that experience more generally.
 (21) Perhaps life is that hard. Perhaps life is like that for all of us in some ways. 
Perhaps you become scared when you wonder what your hardships will be 
— I do not blame you.
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The tentativeness communicated by the three occurrences of perhaps, rhetorically 
reinforced by the explicit engagement resulting from the inclusiveness of us and 
the repeated ‘naming’ of the listeners, via you, effectively ‘opens’ the story for the 
listeners. Without hedging, the statements would have been straightforward asser-
tions that “life is hard” and “life is like that for all of us in some ways” etc., but with 
the hedging an additional inclusive space opens up to incorporate the listeners and 
their experiences. The Catholic preacher who wrote the sermon expresses this in 
the following way:
I express tentativeness to draw people into the story, to give them the space to find 
themselves in the story. For that to happen, I must leave space for their experiences, 
which may well be different from mine. In this way I see the expression of tentative-
ness almost as an invitation for them to join me right there in the unfolding sermon 
story.
Finally, hedging can be seen as having a discourse-structuring function, indicat-
ing a discursive boundary between ‘other’ (God or other external sources, or the 
listeners) and ‘self ’ (preacher). Generally speaking, preaching is characterized by a 
high incidence of ‘otherness’, typically manifested by direct or indirect intertextual 
references or ‘othervoicedness’ (Malmström, in press). The fact that preaching by 
its very nature is hermeneutical assumes two things: (i) many references to other 
sources of information than the preachers themselves, both biblical and non-bib-
lical sources, and (ii) a projection of those engaged in the hermeneutics, i.e. the 
preachers themselves. Hedging is a platform for the latter, and as such it effectively 
features as a demarcation between ‘other-sourced’ information and, no matter 
how temporarily it happens, a discursive perspective ascribable to the preacher. 
In an example like (22), this shift from other to self is very explicit, and the hedge 
provides a clear signal.
 (22) I think that these words speak not of hopelessness, but of an eternal hope in 
the Resurrection of Jesus.
This interpretation was confirmed by the Anglican preacher who is the source of 
(22) when we spoke of his decision to qualify the utterance by I think:
That’s to show them that that is me. That’s [NN] stepping into the sermon, express-
ing my view. I do that all the time, obviously, but sometimes I like to make it clear, 
as in this case.
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7. Concluding remarks
This investigation set out to establish the place of hedging in contemporary preach-
ing as represented by three Christian denominations in the UK. The findings in-
dicate that preachers from across the denominational range considered frequently 
employ ‘standard’ hedging resources, typically not to convey an epistemic attitude 
per se, but as a productive interactional means to address fundamental objectives 
of turn-to-the-listener preaching, elevating and acknowledging sermon listeners 
as active partners in a sermonic conversational experience.
There are, however, several limitations to the study. The first concerns the size 
of the empirical sample; basing the analysis on only 150 sermons and 11 preacher 
interviews makes generalizations problematic. Second, while self-reporting from 
informants is considered a common and useful practice in much discourse analy-
sis, there is always the risk that the analysis attaches inappropriate importance to 
idiosyncrasies. Third, and this is the most obvious shortcoming, since hedging is 
considered a pragmatic phenomenon, a multimodal investigation of the sermons 
as delivered, rather than in manuscript form, would have provided a much richer 
basis for analysis. Hedging clearly does not come only in the form of linguistic 
expressions; prosodic and gestural indicators of hedging (change of tempo, ums, 
ahs, facial expressions, head and hand movements, etc.) may be as important for 
hedging as a modal auxiliary verb or an indefinite expression.
Despite these shortcomings this snapshot of preachers’ metadiscursive hedg-
ing practices raises some potentially interesting implications for religious dis-
course analysis and for homiletics.
This study addresses an obvious gap in the discourse-analytical literature on 
religious discourse; Wuthnow (1992: 60) laments the limited knowledge we have 
concerning “the ways in which religious discourse is actually put together”. Any 
position that religious discourse is somehow irrelevant to anyone outside a reli-
gious context is unsustainable: according to Wuthnow (1992: 59) it is indisput-
able that “the flow of religious discourse [spills] into the public arena with in-
creasing intensity”. In view of this cross-fertilization between religious and secular 
discourses it is important to learn more about how language is used in religious 
discourse. Knowing more about the rhetorical appeal preaching makes to listeners 
through the use of hedging language is at least one step closer to a clearer picture 
of this key genre of religious discourse. Hopefully this piece of research can spark 
further interest in this branch of discourse analysis to address the concerns raised 
by Wuthnow (1992) and others.
The study (theoretical approach, methodological approach, and the findings) 
can be used to inform research in homiletics, a community concerned with further-
ing effective preaching practices, for example by encouraging homiletics to expand 
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its methodological approaches to include more descriptive and data-driven meth-
ods to complement strictly analytical methodologies. Moreover, not only the find-
ings regarding the distribution, form, and function of hedging as applied to con-
temporary sermons, but also the operationalization of hedging as ‘metadiscourse’ 
will add nuance to a continued discussion within homiletics about how preachers 
can explore metadiscursive hedging and engage listeners, thereby sustaining ap-
proaches to teaching preaching to pre-service and in-service practitioners.
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